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In this paper, we exploit a cohort discontinuity in the stringency of the 1993 Dutch disability 
reforms to obtain causal estimates of the effects of decreased generosity of  disability 
insurance (DI) on behavior of existing DI recipients. We find evidence of substantial “social 
support substitution”: individuals on average offset a euro of lost DI benefits by collecting 31 
cents more from other social assistance programs. This benefit-substitution effect declines 
somewhat over time, but is still a significant 20% eight years later. Individuals also exhibit a 
strong rebound in earnings: labor earnings increase by 62 cents on average per euro of lost 
DI benefits. This is novel evidence of substantial remaining earnings capacity in a sample of 
long-term claimants of DI. On average, individuals make up for almost the entire DI benefit 
reduction through increases in other forms of social assistance and in labor earnings. 
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1. Introduction 
Because estimates of labor supply responses are of tremendous policy relevance, 
the literature on the effects of social assistance on behavior has rightly focused on labor 
supply responses to changes in the eligibility criteria or generosity of social assistance 
programs.    These  estimates,  however,  do  not  capture  two  additional  policy-relevant 
dimensions of the response to changes in social assistance programs.  First, they do not 
capture potential spillover effects to other social assistance programs that arise when 
individuals substitute between programs.  Such social support substitution may decrease 
the reduced-form labor supply response to changes in generosity of a particular program 
when  individuals  take  up  other  programs  instead  of  adjusting  their  labor  supply.  
Similarly,  social  support  substitution  reduces  the  welfare  impact  of  reductions  in 
generosity of any given program on recipients of that program.  Evidence on the extent of 
social support substitution is also important for policy makers because it allows them to 
make more accurate predictions of the budgetary impact of a reform to a social assistance 
program by taking into account the spillover effects of the reform on participation in 
other  programs.  Second,  existing  estimates  of  supply  responses  generally  do  not 
distinguish between the responses by existing claimants and responses by (potential) new 
enrollees.  Evidence of labor supply responses among existing long-term DI recipients is 
of great importance for policy reforms because effects that operate on the existing stock 
of recipients have the potential for a much greater immediate impact than reforms that 
operate on the comparatively small inflow into a DI program. 
In this paper, we estimate the extent of social support substitution in response to 
reforms  in  disability  insurance  in  the  Netherlands  as  well  as  the  reduced-form  labor 
supply response to this reform among existing DI recipients.  Together, this allows us to 
estimate the impact of the reform on the total income of affected DI recipients.  The 
reforms  to  the  Dutch  DI  system,  which  also  insures  against  partial  loss  of  earnings 
capacity,  entailed  medical  re-examinations  of  existing  recipients.  A  common 
consequence of the re-examination was a change in the benefit level.  Two features make 
this  reform  particularly  suitable  for  studying  substitution  between  different  social 
assistance programs as well as labor supply responses among current recipients.  First, we 
have administrative panel data on the universe of Dutch disability insurance claimants,   2 
including information on their future labor market earnings and their future income from 
all other government cash social assistance programs.  These data allow us to track for a 
period of nearly a decade what happens to (former) disability insurance claimants in the 
wake of the reform.  Second, the reform contains a cohort discontinuity: the reform was 
significantly more stringent and led to an average benefit reduction of an additional 10% 
for the cohort that turned 45 after August 1
st, 1993.  Because we have each individual’s 
month of birth, we exploit this discontinuity by comparing later labor market earnings 
and social assistance income for the cohort just below this age cutoff to outcomes for the 
cohort  just  above  the  age  cutoff.    We  scale  this  difference  in  outcomes  by  the 
discontinuity in disability benefit levels around the age cut-off.  This yields two key 
ratios: (i) the benefit-substitution ratio, which is the average causal effect of the more 
stringent DI rules on income from other social assistance as a fraction of average lost DI 
income, and (ii) the earnings crowd-out ratio, which is the average causal effect of the 
more stringent DI rules on earnings as a fraction of average lost DI income. 
We find that, in the short term (about 2 years after reform), the more stringent DI 
rules  increase  the  probability  of  receiving  any  income  from  other  social  assistance 
programs by 5 percentage points (on a base of 14 percent), and the income from these 
other social assistance programs replaces 31% of lost DI income.  In other words, we find 
a substantial amount of social support substitution with a short-term benefit-substitution 
ratio  of  0.31.    The  more  stringent  rules  increase  the  probability  of  having  any  labor 
market earnings by 3 percentage points (on a base of 35 percent) and also increase labor 
earnings on average.  The additional earnings replace 62% of foregone DI income, i.e., 
the earnings crowd-out ratio is 0.62.  Recipients classified as fully disabled have a crowd-
out ratio of 0.52, which is novel evidence of a substantial labor supply response among 
long-term  fully  disabled  individuals.    Combining  the  effects  of  social  assistance 
substitution and earnings crowd out, we find that individuals are able to replace basically 
all  of  their  foregone  DI  income  on  average.  Specifically,  we  cannot  reject  that 
individuals fully offset the cut in their DI benefit by increased income from other social 
assistance programs and labor earnings. 
Over time (up to 8 years after the re-examinations for our cohorts), the benefit-
substitution ratio falls somewhat and the earnings crowd-out increases slightly, but these   3 
trends  are  not  significant  in  either  ratio.    Even  in  2005,  or  about  8  years  after  the 
implementation  of  the  reform,  the  benefit-substitution  ratio  is  still  a  statistically  and 
economically significant 0.20 and the earnings crowd-out ratio stands at 0.71.  Spillovers 
between social assistance programs may operate not only through former DI recipients’ 
own choices, but could potentially also operate through the decisions of their spouses.  
However, we do not find any statistically significant evidence of responses by spouses in 
terms  of  labor  supply  or  social  assistance  receipt.    The  point  estimates  indicate  that 
spouses increase their labor supply but do not change their social assistance receipt.  This 
implies that if we measure earnings crowd out and benefit substitution at the household 
level rather than at the individual level, we find a slightly (about 18 percentage point) 
higher earnings crowd-out ratio and a similar benefit-substitution ratio. 
  While  the  precise  magnitudes  of  our  findings  are  obviously  specific  to  this 
particular  Dutch  disability  insurance  reform,  we  believe  our  paper  offers  important 
lessons that are widely applicable.  First, our evidence demonstrates that social support 
substitution  occurs  at  an  economically  meaningful  scale  for  prime-age  disability 
insurance recipients.  Hence, a carefully designed reform of a social assistance program 
needs to take into account its effects on other social assistance programs.  Second, our 
findings  show  that  even  long-term  disability  insurance  recipients  can  still  exhibit  a 
meaningful rebound in their labor supply.  Third, to measure the full impact of social 
insurance reforms on labor supply and the reliance on other forms of social insurance, it 
is important to also consider effects over the longer term and to take possible behavioral 
responses of spouses into account. 
  Our  findings  on  the  existence  of  spillover  effects  between  different  social 
assistance programs confirm earlier results from other contexts.
1  With respect to child-
related benefits, Garrett and Glied (2000) show that the increase in child Supplemental 
Security  Income  (SSI)  eligibility  in  the  early  1990s  led  to  a  greater  increase  in  SSI 
enrollment  in  states  with  less  generous  benefits  for  Aid  to  Families  with  Dependent 
                                                 
1 The one exception is a paper by Autor and Duggan (2008), in which they exploit a ruling that suddenly 
expanded the eligibility for Veterans’ Disability Compensation (DC) for a subgroup of Vietnam Veterans.  
They find that the increased take-up of Veteran’s Disability Compensation due to this ruling raised the 
receipt of Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits.  As Autor and Duggan note, this result may 
be explained by the fact that one needs leave the labor force to qualify for SSDI, and leaving the labor force 
is  less  costly  for  people  who  already  receive  DC.    Thus,  this  institutional  feature  may  explain  the 
complementarity between two social assistance programs in this case.   4 
Children (AFDC) while Schmidt and Sevak (2004) show that states that reduced the 
generosity  of  their  AFDC  program  experienced  increases  in  SSI  enrollments.  Both 
studies suggest that families use SSI and AFDC as substitutes.  Kubik (2003) shows that 
the  substitution  of  SSI  for  AFDC  is  larger  in  states  with  negative  fiscal  shocks, 
suggesting that states actively encouraged this substitution (because the state-share in SSI 
payments  is  generally  lower  than  the  state-share  in  AFDC  payments).    Duggan  and 
Kearney (2007) examine individual-level panel data to find that households in which a 
child becomes eligible for SSI subsequently receive less income from AFDC, WIC, and 
food stamps.
2  With respect to early retirement, Duggan, Singleton, and Song (2007), Li 
and Maestas (2008), and Coe and Haverstick (2010) exploit differences by cohort in the 
generosity  of  Social  Security  retirement  benefits  to  show  that  the  reduction  in  the 
generosity of Social Security retirement benefits led to increases in applications for or 
receipt  of  Social  Security  disability  benefits.    Koning  and  Van  Vuuren  (2010)  use 
administrative  data  to  describe  program  enrolment  after  dismissal,  and  find  that  DI 
substitutes for UI but fail to find evidence that UI substitutes for DI.  Karlström, Palme, 
and Svensson (2008) use a difference-in-differences design to examine the effect of the 
abolition of DI as a path to early retirement for 60-64 year olds in Sweden.  They find 
that, in the 2-3 years following the reform, this group responded by taking up other forms 
of social assistance rather than by increasing their labor supply.  Finally, Staubli (2011) 
also uses a difference-in-differences approach to show that a disability insurance reform 
that affected 55-56 year-old males in Austria had spillover effects on their take up of 
unemployment insurance and sick leave, in addition to affecting their labor supply.  Our 
paper  contributes  to  this  literature  by  estimating  substitution  between  social  support 
programs for prime-age individuals, and doing this in a setting that allows us to very 
cleanly identify the degree of spillovers between programs.  In addition, we extend the 
literature by examining substitution effects over longer horizons (up to eight years after 
the re-examinations for our cohorts took place).   
  Our estimates also contribute to an extensive literature on the labor supply effects 
of disability insurance (see Bound and Burkhauser 1999 for an overview) by showing 
well-identified effects on the labor supply of existing long-term DI participants.  Parsons 
                                                 
2 WIC provides nutritional assistance to low-income families with young children and pregnant women.   5 
(1980)  shows  cross-sectional  evidence  that  suggests  that  the  rise  DI  generosity  has 
contributed to the decline in male labor force participation.  Gruber (2000) exploits a 
natural  experiment  in  Canada  and  finds  a  sizeable  labor  force  participation  response 
among older workers to the generosity of DI benefits.  Much of the more recent work in 
the  U.S.  on  labor  supply  effects  of  DI  compares  accepted  to  rejected  DI  applicants.  
Bound (1989) and Von Wachter, Song, and Manchester (2011) directly compare accepted 
and rejected applicants, and those estimates are probably upperbounds of labor supply 
effects because there are likely unmeasured determinants of the rejection decision that are 
correlated  with  labor  supply.    To  get  around  this  issue,  other  studies  use  plausibly 
exogenous variation in rejection rates.  Gruber and Kubic (1997) use variation across 
states  and  time  in  rejection  rates,  Chen  and  Van  der  Klaauw  (2008)  use  an  age 
discontinuity in rejection rates for a particular subgroup, De Jong, Lindeboom, and Van 
der  Klaauw  (2010)  use  variation  in  screening  severity  induced  by  an  experimental 
intervention, French and Song (2011) use variation in rejection rates due the essentially 
random assignment of administrative law judges to DI cases, and Maestas, Mullen, and 
Strand (2011) use variation in rejection rates due the essentially random assignment of DI 
examiners to DI cases.  These studies all find clear evidence of labor supply responses to 
disability insurance.  Autor and Duggan (2003) exploit the interaction of state disability 
replacement rates with national changes in program stringency to find credible evidence 
that increased DI generosity reduced labor force participation of high school dropouts.  
Finally, Maestas and Song (2011) use the automatic conversion of DI into Social Security 
benefits to show that there is a labor supply effect of DI on older disability insurance 
recipients.  Our study contributes to this literature by showing the labor supply responses 
not only occur at the point of the initial eligibility determination, but that there are strong 
labor supply responses to changes in DI generosity even among prime-age long-term 
disability insurance recipients, including individuals classified as fully disabled.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the 
reform in the Dutch disability act that we use for identification in this paper. Section 3 
describes the data, and Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 concludes. 
   6 
2. The 1993 Dutch Disability Insurance Reform 
After a waiting period of one year, individuals in the Netherlands are entitled to 
disability benefits if an illness or infirmity prevents them from earning the amount they 
used to earn before the onset of the disability.
3  The replacement rate offered by DI 
depends  on  the  “degree  of  disability,”  which  is  defined  by  the  percentage  difference 
between  the  prior  earnings  and  the  remaining  potential  earnings  capacity  of  the  DI 
applicant.  In other words, the Dutch DI system also covers partial disability.  Health 
insurance is not linked to DI in the Netherlands, so this is not a consideration for DI 
participation. 
In order to explain the 1993 DI reform, we first describe how the Dutch disability 
insurance system determined eligibility and replacement rates prior to the reform.  Prior 
to the reform, the potential earnings capacity was determined by the following procedure.  
First, a medical doctor examined the applicant and compiled a list of work activities that, 
according to the doctor’s judgment, the applicant could still perform.
4  Second, using a 
dictionary of occupations that specified for each occupation the required education level 
and  work  activities,  a  list  of  occupations  that  an  applicant  could  still  perform  was 
compiled, but occupations that were more than two “education levels” (on a 7-level scale) 
below  the  education  level  required  for  the  applicant’s  previous  occupation  were  not 
considered.  Finally, if the list contained at least 5 suitable occupations with at least 10 
active workers (though not necessarily vacancies) in the applicant’s region
5, then the 
mean wage of the 5 highest paying occupations on the list was taken as the applicant’s 
potential earnings capacity. The loss of earnings due to the disability, measured by the 
difference  between  the  prior  labor  earnings  and  the  potential  earnings  capacity, 
determined  the  degree  of  disability.    If  it  was  not  possible  to  specify  5  suitable 
occupations  with  at  least  10  workers,  the  degree  of  disability  was  set  at  100%.  The 
                                                 
3 Also see Bovenberg (2000), who provides useful institutional background information on the Dutch 
disability act.  See García-Gómez, Von Gaudecker, and Lindeboom (2011) for further background 
information and descriptive evidence on DI enrollment trends and patterns. 
4 The list includes 27 physical activities (such as “lifting,” “kneeling,” and “ability to deal with temperature 
fluctuations”) and a list of 10 psychological abilities (such as “ability to work under time pressure,” “ability 
to perform monotonous work,” and “ability to deal with conflict”). 
5 The Netherlands was divided up in 5 regions and in 16 “start regions.” Alternative jobs had to be found in 
the “start regions” first. Only if none were available, the labor market expert could look for jobs in the 
neighboring regions (within one of the main 5 regions).   7 
measured degrees of disability were grouped into 8 categories varying from 0-15% to 80-
100%,  and  these  categories  determined  the  replacement  rate  (see  Table  1).  The 
replacement rate was applied to the individual’s indexed previous earnings, where the 
previous earnings are subject to cap (about €36,000/year in 1999).  Individuals on DI 
have an earnings exemption equal to their capped indexed previous earnings times the 
degree they are not disabled (which is set at 100% minus the lowerbound of their degree 
disabled category).  Earnings above the exemption lead to a one-for-one reduction in DI 
benefits in the short term, and to a reclassification in the degree disabled in the longer 
term (typically after about 3 years). 
The  DI  reforms  of  1993  tightened  this  procedure  in  two  respects.
6  First,  the 
determination of disability had to be based on objective medical information (rather than 
just  the  doctor’s  judgment).  In  other  words,  the  applicant  needed  to  have  a  clearly 
observable functional work limitation, and a direct relationship between the functional 
work limitation and the medical diagnosis had to be plausible.  Disabilities due to mental 
health problems became more difficult to prove than physical health problems.  Second, 
the criteria for the list of suitable alternative occupations were relaxed: (i) occupations 
more than two “education levels” below the applicant’s education level were included 
from now on, (ii) the list only needed to contain 3 suitable alternative occupations (rather 
than 5), and (iii) the geographic region in which these occupations had to exist with at 
least 10 active workers was expanded roughly threefold.
7  With these relaxed criteria, it 
became more likely to find higher-paying alternative occupations and less likely that the 
list would not contain at least the minimum number (now 3) of occupations needed to 
avoid  declaring  the  applicant  as  fully  disabled.    By  changing  the  criteria  for  what 
constituted suitable alternative employment, the reform aimed to lower the generosity of 
disability benefits and to reduce the number of claimants.
8  
                                                 
6 The formal name of the 1993 UI reforms is “Terugdringing Beroep op Arbeidsongeschiktheidsverzeker-
ingen (TBA),” which roughly translates as “Reducing claims on disability insurance.” 
7 Now all available jobs within the main region where the individual was residing (out of 5 main regions) 
could be used to calculate the potential earnings capacity, rather than just jobs in one of the 16 “start 
regions.” 
8 Another important change of the 1993 DI reform was the introduction of an age- and duration-dependent 
benefit for new applicants.  To those already receiving disability benefits as of August 1993, i.e. the group 
that we are studying here, these changes did not apply and the benefit level remained a function of the 
indexed previous earnings.   8 
The new procedure for determining benefits was applied to new DI applicants as 
well as to existing DI claimants who were 50 or younger at the time the reform went into 
effect  (August  1
st,  1993).    Because  re-examinations  of  existing  claimants  are  time 
consuming, these re-examinations were scheduled to take place by cohort over a period 
of several years. Disability claimants who were age 34 or younger on the 1
st of August 
1993 were re-examined in 1994, the 35-40 year-old cohort in 1995, the 41-44 year-old 
cohort in 1996/1997, and the 45-50 year-old cohort were to be re-examined in 1997-
2001. However, shortly before the re-examinations for this latter cohort started, political 
pressure led the government to decide to that the 45-50 age cohort would be re-examined 
based on the previous and more generous procedure for determining replacement rates 
rather  than  the  new  and  more  stringent  procedure.    While  re-examinations  tended  to 
lower benefits, this was not necessarily the case for every claimant.  Some disability 
claimants  saw  their  benefits  rise,  for  example  because  their  medical  condition  had 
deteriorated.  However, because the new procedure is more stringent in all respects, the 
benefit determined under the new procedure is weakly lower than what it would have 
been for that particular individual if the old procedure had still been used. 
 
3. Data 
3.1 Data sources 
This paper relies on administrative data that Statistics Netherlands has assembled 
from several sources.  Information from these various sources is merged at the individual 
level by using a so-called RIN-number (which is a coded version of the Dutch equivalent 
of the U.S. Social Security number).
9 
First, we have administrative data on all disability benefits recipients aged 15-64 
in  the  Netherlands  for  the  period  1995-2005.    The  data  were  collected  by  the 
organizations  responsible  for  administering  disability  benefits.  The  information  from 
these  administrative  records  include  the  start  and  end  dates  of  a  disability  spell,  the 
degree  of  disability  (in  categories),  disability  benefit  payments,  previous  earnings, 
industry information, and the reason for the termination of the disability spell, but does 
                                                 
9  These data can be accessed via a remote-access computer after a confidentiality statement has been 
signed.   9 
not contain reliable or consistent information about the medical condition that gave rise 
to the disability spell. 
We obtain the demographic characteristics of the disability claimants from the 
municipal  registries  (“GBA”),  which  contain  all  residents  of  the  Netherlands.    This 
database includes information on each person’s month and year of birth, marital status, 
number of children, national origin, and place of residence, as well as the identification 
numbers    (RIN-codes)  of  their  partners.    The  RIN-codes  of  the  partners  allow  us  to 
include income sources of the partner.  We collect these demographic characteristics as of 
January 1996, which is the start of our sample period. 
Finally, we obtain information on labor market earnings and sources of social 
assistance income other than DI by merging five administrative datasets: earnings of all 
employees,  self-employment  earnings,  unemployment  benefits  (“WW”),  general 
assistance (“Bijstand”), and receipt of any other form of social assistance (from about 30 
relatively minor programs).  Data on social assistance come from the organizations that 
administer these programs.  Information about the earnings from paid labor and self-
employment  are  gathered  by  Statistics  Netherlands  using  information  from  the  tax 
authorities and social insurance records.  All these files are available from 1999 onwards, 
which is why 1999 is the start year for our empirical analysis.  Unemployment insurance 
covers any income loss due to unemployment for a duration of up to 5 years, where the 
duration depends on one’s work history.  General assistance is unlimited in duration and 
does  not  require  dependents  (unlike  the  U.S.  welfare  program),  but  is  means  tested.  
Apart from the programs mentioned here, there are no additional cash social assistance 
programs in the Netherlands that are relevant for individuals in the age range of our 
sample.  Exact variable definitions are provided in Appendix B. 
 
3.2 Sample definition 
In our baseline analysis, we restrict the sample to all individuals who (i) received 
disability benefits on August 1
st, 1993, (ii) who were between the ages of 42.5 and 47.5 at 
that date, and (iii) who were still on DI as of January 1
st, 1996.  The first restriction is 
necessary because the discontinuity in benefit rules only applies to existing claimants on 
the date the reform went into effect.  The second restriction limits the sample to those   10 
who are close to age 45, where the discontinuity in benefit rules occurs.  We selected this 
bandwidth  based  on  the  criterion  by  Imbens  and  Kalyanaraman  (2009).
10  The  last 
restriction is driven by data availability.  While our data on disability starts in 1995, the 
information in the 1995 file does not contain previous earnings, so we use the files from 
1996 onwards instead.  Thus, we can only observe individuals who were on disability at 
the time of the passage of the reform legislation if they remained on disability until 
January  of  1996  or  later.    We  believe  it  is  highly  unlikely  that  differential  attrition 
occurred  around  the  age  discontinuity  prior  to  January  1
st  of  1996  because  the  re-
examinations for the individuals in our sample did not start until later in 1996 and the 
government decided only in 1997 that the age 45+ cohort would not be subject to the 
new, more stringent criteria.
11  A plot of the density of disability claimants by cohort is 
relatively smooth and therefore gives no indication of differential attrition (see Appendix 
Figure A1).  The plot further indicates that heaping-induced bias (Barreca, Lindo, and 
Waddell, 2011) is not a concern and that there is no discontinuity in the density around 
the cutoff age of 45 (p-value of 0.126 in the McCrary, 2008, density test).  Our data 
extends until 2005 because in 2006 there was a fundamental reform to DI.  
We exclude all individuals that appeared on more than one disability record in our 
data in a given month (about 3 percent of the sample). We exclude these observations 
because it is not clear whether they reflect administrative/coding errors or whether they 
truly concern individuals who are entitled to two (or more) different disability insurance 
benefits because they were employed in two (or more) jobs before they became disabled. 
In the latter case it is hard to understand why we observe that in many of these cases there 
has been a health improvement (i.e., a reduction in the degree of disability) during a 
particular period for one of the benefit claims, but not for the other.  We have checked 
that no discontinuity occurs at age 45 in the likelihood that an individual has more than 
one disability record, and are therefore not concerned that the omission or inclusion of 
                                                 
10 The Imbens-Kalyanaraman criterion yields different optimal bandwidths for different outcome variables. 
Rather than changing the sample for each outcome variable, we selected a bandwidth in the middle of the 
optimal bandwidths suggested by the Imbens-Kalyanaraman criterion, and applied this bandwidth to all our 
specifications. Below, we show that our key results are robust to using different bandwidths. 
11 Please note that we refer to cohorts by their age at the time the reform went into effect (i.e., as of August 
1
st, 1993).   11 
the 3 percent of observations with multiple records would substantively affect our results.  
After these sample restrictions, our baseline sample contains 84,185 observations.
  
 
3.3 Summary statistics 
Table 2 presents summary statistics for our key variables.  Panel A shows the 
characteristics  of  our  sample  measured  as  of  January  1996,  i.e.  before  the  re-
examinations took place.  About a third of disability claimants are female and about two 
thirds are married.  The average DI spell started in 1985.  So when the reform was 
implemented in 1996-1998 for the cohorts in our sample, the average claimant in our data 
had been on DI for more than a decade.  Finally, about two thirds of the sample is 
classified as fully disabled (earnings capacity reduction of 80% or more) and is therefore 
eligible for a replacement rate of 70%.  The fraction fully disabled is markedly higher 
among females than among males.  Only about 4% of the sample is considered to have 
lost between 55% and 80% of their earnings capacity. The remaining 30% of the sample 
is considered to have lost between 15% and 55% of their earnings capacity and is eligible 
for replacement rates between 14% and 35%.  
Panel B presents the means of our key outcome variables.  While we have these 
variables for all years from 1999 through 2005, we only present the values for 1999 and 
2005 in the interest of space.  In 1999, so about 1 to 3 years after the re-examinations 
took place for the age cohorts in our sample, 92% of those on DI at the start of 1996 were 
still on DI, where being on DI in 1999 is defined as having received positive income from 
DI  in  1999.  In  short,  the  re-examinations  cannot  have  had  a  dramatic  effect  on  DI 
participation, though our next section will show evidence of a clear discontinuity in exit 
rates around the age cutoff.  About 36% percent of our sample was working, defined as 
having positive earnings (including from self-employment) in 1999, which is consistent 
with DI also covering partial disability in the Netherlands.  Of those who had left DI, 
53% were employed, whereas 33% of those on DI were employed, so a considerable 
number combined DI receipt with work.  The fraction of men working (45%) is more 
than twice as high as the fraction of females with positive labor earnings (18%).  Sixteen 
percent of our sample also had social assistance income (other than from the original DI 
spell) in 1999.  Another four percent are not observed in any of our administrative files.   12 
Most of these individuals did not have any formal labor or social assistance income in 
1999 but about a third of them died or emigrated during our sample period.
12 
The average income in our sample is about €17,000, of which roughly two-thirds 
comes from DI benefits with the remaining third coming mostly from labor earnings.  
Income  from  other  social  assistance  programs  accounts  only  for  about  6%  of  total 
income. 
In 2005, so about 7 to 9 years after the re-examinations, 81% of those on DI at the 
start of 1996 were still on DI.  Between 1999 and 2005, the fraction employed fell from 
36% to 28% and the fraction with income from social assistance other than from the 
original  DI  spell  increased  from  16%  to  25%.    These  trends  are  consistent  with  the 
general  decline  in  labor  force  participation  in  the  Netherlands  as  people  approach 
retirement.  In 2005, still about two-thirds of total income in our sample comes from DI 
benefits. 
 
4.  Results 
4.1 Magnitude of the reform 
To what extent did the more stringent re-examinations reduce the generosity of 
the  DI  program  for  the  under-45  cohort?    The  answer  to  this  question  allows  us  to 
interpret the magnitude of the effects of the reform on earnings and on receipt of other 
forms  of  social  assistance.    Figure  1  shows  three  measures  by  which  to  gauge  the 
magnitude of the reform: the effect on benefit amounts, the effect on replacement rates, 
and the effect on participation in the DI program.   
Panel A plots annual disability benefit amounts in 1999, including zeros for those 
who have exited, by cohort.  Visually, there is a clear discontinuity at the cutoff age.  We 
estimate the size of this discontinuity by running an OLS regression of the outcome 
variable on a treatment dummy that equals 1 for cohorts subject to the more stringent re-
examinations  (so  age  less  than  45),  a  linear  term  in  age,  and  an  interaction  of  the 
treatment dummy with (age-45).  All ages are specified as ages as of 8/1/93, so they 
                                                 
12 About 1.1% of our sample had died by 1999 and 0.3% had emigrated.  These observations are included 
in the main analysis and their income and participation variables are all set to zero in 1999.  Results are 
extremely similar if we exclude these observations altogether.  The more stringent reforms had no 
significant impact on the probability of death or the probability of emigration.   13 
effectively measure cohorts.  We run this specification for all RD estimates reported in 
the figures in the paper.  The fitted regression line is indicated in the plot, and the RD 
estimate  on  the  treatment  dummy  is  -1.076,  indicating  that  the  more  stringent  re-
examinations for the younger cohort reduced their annual DI benefits by €1076, or about 
10%.  All reduced-form RD estimates can be seen as local average treatment effects – 
local in the sense that they only apply at the discontinuity (so for the cohort being exactly 
45 as of 8/1/93) and average in the sense that it is the average effect for all those at the 
discontinuity.  The key identifying assumption behind all our RD estimates is that the 
only discontinuous change at the age cutoff is the stringency of the DI re-examinations.  
While we cannot test this assumption, we know of no other policy changes that would 
create  a  discontinuity  at  this  cutoff.    Further,  when  we  run  our  reduced-form  RD 
specification using all our demographic characteristics as dependent variables, we only 
find two significant coefficients, in line with what would expect under the null hypothesis 
of no effect when running 39 placebo regressions.
13  
Panel B shows that the replacement rate, including zeros for those who exited, is 
5.9 percentage points lower for the affected cohort at the discontinuity.
14  The average 
replacement rate for those who just escaped the more stringent re-examinations is 0.55, 
so the 5.9 percentage point drop represents an 11 percent decline.  Panel C shows that the 
fraction of the sample that is still on the original DI spell in 1999 falls discontinuously by 
3.8 percentage points at the age cutoff.  Overall, Figure 1 shows that the more stringent 
re-examinations roughly translate into a 10% benefit reduction. The effects of the reform 
on labor supply and other benefit receipt should be viewed in light of this magnitude. 
The reforms led to somewhat larger reductions in benefits and replacement rates 
for men (reductions by 12%) than for women (reductions by 7%), but induced 6.1 percent 
                                                 
13 The demographic characteristics are measured as of January 1996, i.e., before the implementation of the 
reform for our sample, and therefore should not contain a discontinuity.  Reassuringly, only two of the 39 
estimates are significant at the 5-percent level.  This is roughly what one would expect by pure chance 
given that, even if there is no true effect, one out of every 20 regressions on average shows a coefficient 
that is significant at the 5-percent level.  In addition, there is one coefficient that is significant at the 10-
percent level.  The full results are presented in Appendix Table A1. It would be instructive to do similar 
checks on the identification strategy with our key outcome variables: labor income and income from other 
social assistance programs.  Unfortunately, we do not have data on these variables prior to 1999. 
14 The data do not contain the post-reform replacement rate for those who exited from DI.  Based on 
discussions with the DI administration, our impression is that most exits occurred for those who were no 
longer eligible for DI, but we cannot rule out that some of those who exited were still eligible for a positive 
replacement rate.   14 
of female recipients to exit but only 2.7 percent of male recipients.  It is not clear what 
exactly drives these differences, but many factors (types of jobs, types of disabilities, 
outside options) obviously differ by gender, and it is therefore plausible that the reform 
had a differential impact by gender.  In light of this differential impact, we will split out 
our key results by gender. 
Because we do not have income measures from before the reform, we cannot 
estimate effects of the reform on income from labor and from other social assistance 
programs separately for those staying on DI and for those leaving DI.  However, we do 
have the pre-reform replacement rate, which allows us to examine heterogeneity in the 
effects of the reform on replacement rates.  
The first column of Table 3 shows the change in replacement rates at age 45.0 for 
those subject to the less stringent re-examination.
15  About 72% of this group saw no 
change in their replacement rate, 12% experienced an increase in their replacement rate, 
and  16%  faced  a  decrease  in  their  replacement  rate.    The  second  column  shows  the 
change in the replacement rates at age 45.0 for those who underwent the more stringent 
re-examination.  A much larger fraction (29%) in is latter group experienced a reduction 
in  the  replacement  rate,  and  a  much  lower  fraction  (5%)  saw  an  increase  in  the 
replacement rate.  Still, even in the group subject to the more stringent re-examination, 
about two thirds experienced no change in the replacement rate.  The third column shows 
the  treatment  effect  of  the  more  stringent  re-examination  on  the  change  in  the 
replacement rate, which is simply the difference between the first two columns.  This 
column  shows  a  downward  shift  in  probability  mass  throughout  the  distribution  of 
changes in replacement rates, showing that the re-examination made DI less generous for 
each counterfactual change in replacement rates.   
                                                 
15 We run our standard reduced-form RD specification using dummies for each possible change in the 
replacement rate as the dependent variables.  We estimate changes in the replacement rate at age 45.0 for 
those subject to the less stringent re-examination as the intercept of the right segment of regression line at 
age 45.0. Changes in the replacement rate for those subject to the more stringent re-examination are 
estimated by the intercept of the left segment of regression line at age 45.0.  More detailed estimates are 
provided in Appendix Table A2, which presents the joint distribution of the replacement rate in 1996 (pre 
reform) and 1999 (post reform) at age 45.0 for those who were subject to the less stringent re-examination 
rules and well as the impact of the reform on these joint probabilities (estimated by the RD effect).  The 
estimates in Table 3 summarize these joint probabilities by presenting the sums of the diagonal entries of 
the Appendix Table.   15 
As  an  additional  partial  check  on  our  identifying  assumption  that  no  factors 
besides the DI re-examinations had a discontinuous impact at age 45, Figure 2 reports DI 
exit rates separately for 1995, 1996/97, 1998, and 1999.  Exit is defined as the end date of 
the original DI spell, as recorded in the administrative data file, occurring during the year 
in question.  We calculate these rates as fractions of DI claimants in our sample on 
January 1
st, 1996.
16  Since no re-examinations took place in 1995 for DI claimants in the 
age 40+ cohorts, a discontinuity at age 45 in the 1995 exit rate would invalidate our 
identifying assumption.  Reassuringly, the 1995 exit rate shows no sign of a discontinuity 
at age 45.  In 1996 en 1997, the age 40-44 cohort was re-examined as well as part of the 
age 45 cohort.  Exactly in these years, the discontinuity at age 45 is very pronounced.  In 
1998,  the  remainder  of  the  age  45  cohort  and  some  of  the  age  46  cohort  were  re-
examined,  which  explains  the  statistically  significant  discontinuity  in  the  opposite 
direction.  This discontinuity, however, is much smaller in size because the age 45+ 
cohort was re-examined under the old and less stringent standards.  Hence, if we calculate 
the total exit rate over the 1996-1998 period, we find a discontinuous increase in exit for 
the group subject to the more stringent re-examinations.  In 1999, all the re-examinations 
for the age 44-45 cohort were completed and we find no discontinuity in exit rates at the 
age cutoff. 
   
4.2  Reduced-form impacts on labor market and social assistance outcomes 
  To what extent did individuals whose DI was reduced by the reform end up in 
other social assistance programs and to what extent did they find paid work?  The answer 
to this question is critical for judging the effectiveness of the reform.  In the former case, 
the reform merely shuffles individuals across programs and budgetary savings only occur 
to the extent that benefits in other programs are lower than DI benefits.  In the latter case, 
increased earnings are an indication of moral hazard among existing disability recipients.  
In this subsection, we examine labor market and social assistance outcomes in 1999, 
which is the first year for which we have the required data, and which is about two years 
after the re-examinations took place.  In subsection 4.6, we will examine the effects over 
a longer horizon. 
                                                 
16 However, the exit rate for 1995 is calculated as a fraction of DI recipients as of January 1
st, 1995.   16 
  We start by analyzing the reduced-form effects of the DI reform on receipt of 
other forms of social assistance.  The first panel of Figure 3 plots income from other 
social assistance (including income from new DI spells, but excluding income from the 
original DI spell) by cohort.  The figure shows a clear upward jump in income from other 
social assistance for the cohort that underwent the more stringent re-examinations.  In 
fact, the RD regression estimates that the more stringent re-examinations increased other 
social assistance income by €314 per year.  The second panel shows that the fraction 
receiving any social assistance income from a source other than the original DI spell 
discontinuously increases by 4.7 percentage points at the age cutoff for the more stringent 
re-examinations.  Both increases are highly significant and represent an increase of about 
a third in the amount and in the participation rate.  In other words, we find clear evidence 
of substitution of other forms of social assistance for DI benefits. 
  Do people who leave DI fully account for the increased income from other social 
assistance or is some of the increase also caused by those who remain on DI receiving 
higher amounts?  To answer this question, we re-run the RD regression on the subsample 
of those who left DI.  The regression shows that income from other social assistance 
jumps by €601/year at the age discontinuity; the regression line just to the right of the age 
cutoff  (where  the  re-examination  was  less  stringent)  lies  at  €1962  of  other  social 
assistance income per year, whereas it lies at €2564/year just to the left of the age cutoff 
(where  the  re-examination  was  more  stringent).    Some  of  those  who  exited  are 
“inframarginal”  leavers  –  they  would  have  left  DI  even  under  the  less  stringent  re-
examination.  These inframarginal leavers were by definition not affected by the increase 
in stringency of the re-examination at the age discontinuity, and we therefore assume that 
other social assistance income is equal to €1962/year on both sides of the age cutoff for 
inframarginal leavers.  The participation rate just at the right of the age continuity is 
93.2% (see Figure 1c), so 6.8% are inframarginal leavers.  Figure 1c also showed that 
3.8% are marginal leavers, so 35.8% (=3.8/(6.8+3.8)) of all leavers are marginal leavers 
and  64.2%  are  inframarginal  leavers.    This  implies  that  income  from  other  social 
assistance  for  marginal  leavers  must  have  been  €3644  per  year  so  that  the  weighted 
average of all leavers to the left of the discontinuity is the amount we found above, 
namely €2564  (so 0.358*3644 + 0.642*1962 = 2564).  If marginal leavers receive €3644   17 
per year from other social assistance, the maximum amount by which their income from 
other  social  assistance  could  have  possibly  increased  due  to  the  more  stringent  re-
examination is €3644.  Given that they comprise only 3.8% of the of the entire sample (so 
both stayers and leavers) at the age cutoff, they can at most account for an increase of 
0.038*3644 = €138 in the RD estimate of €314/year that we found for the entire sample.  
Thus, we conclude that those leaving DI altogether can at most be responsible for 44% 
(=138/314) of the overall jump in income from other social assistance, and that at least 
56% must be due to increases in other social assistance income by those remaining on DI. 
  Next,  we  present  the  reduced-form  effects  of  the  DI  reform  on  labor  market 
outcomes. The first panel of Figure 4 plots labor earnings, including self-employment 
income, in 1999 by cohort.  The figure shows a discontinuity in earnings at the cutoff age 
but the discontinuity is not as visually compelling as in the earlier figures due to the 
higher variance in earnings.  However, the RD regression estimates that earnings are 
€624 per year higher at the cutoff age for those who were subject to the more stringent re-
examinations, and this estimate is highly significant.  The €624 increase represents an 11 
percent increase in annual earnings.  This figure establishes our qualitative finding that 
disability income crowds out labor income.  It also contributes to the literature on the 
labor supply disincentive effects of disability insurance by showing novel evidence of 
labor supply responses among prime-age DI recipients who are long-term recipients of DI 
(with durations of at least 2 years at the time of the reform, but on average 10 years).  We 
will discuss the economic magnitude of the labor supply response in the next subsection. 
  Because we do not have earnings for prior years, we cannot precisely determine 
the extent to which the average increase in earnings stems from non-workers finding 
employment (extensive margin) and from workers increasing their earnings (intensive 
margin).    However,  at  least  some  of  the  increase  comes  from  the  extensive  margin 
because  the  second  panel  of  Figure  4  shows  a  clear  discontinuity  in  the  fraction  of 
individuals  with  strictly  positive  income  from  wages  or  self-employment.    The  RD 
regression estimates that the more stringent re-examinations caused the fraction working 
to increase by 2.9 percentage points.  To explain the observed increase in earnings in the 
absence of an intensive-margin labor supply response, average earnings for those who 
started working would need to be €21,500 (=624/0.029) per year, which is higher than the   18 
observed average earnings for those with positive earnings (€17,000/year).  It therefore 
seems likely that some of the response also occurred along the intensive margin.  We can 
also do a bounding calculation similar to the one we did above for income from other 
social benefits.  We find that those who left DI altogether can at most be responsible for 
61% of the overall jump in earnings caused by the more stringent re-examination, and 
that at least 39% must be due to earnings increases among those remaining on DI.   
 
4.3 Benefit Substitution and Earnings Crowd Out 
  Figures 3 and 4 establish that people substitute between DI income and other 
forms of social assistance, and that DI benefits crowd out labor income.  We now turn to 
the economic magnitudes of earnings crowd out and substitution of social assistance.  In 
the first column of Table 4, we scale our reduced-form estimates by the amount by which 
disability benefits from the original spell decrease at the age discontinuity whereas in the 
second column we scale by the discontinuity in the replacement rate.  We implement this 
scaling by running IV regressions following the standard “fuzzy RD” specification.
17  We 
include  a  rich  set  of  demographic  control  variables  to  increase  the  precision  of  the 
estimates.    As  should  the  case  with  a  valid  RD  design,  the  control  variables  do  not 
substantially affect the magnitudes of our estimates (See Appendix Table A3 for the 
corresponding  estimates  without  controls).    Given  that  the  re-examination  was  in  all 
respects  more  stringent  for  those  below  the  cutoff  age,  the  monotonicity  assumption 
required for the fuzzy RD design should be satisfied; being subject to a re-examination 
following the more stringent new protocol rather than the old protocol weakly decreases 
the benefit amount for any given individual and weakly decreases the replacement rate 
for any given individual.  We do not interpret these IV estimates as causal impacts of the 
level  of  DI  benefits  per  se  or  as  causal  estimates  of  the  DI  replacement  rate  per  se 
because at the age discontinuity both the level of benefits and the earnings exemption 
change.    Rather,  we  see  the  IV  estimates  as  a  way  to  relate  the  magnitudes  of  the 
behavior effects of the reform to alterative measures of the size of the reform.  In other 
words, we view this solely as a scaling exercise.  
                                                 
17 Excellent discussions of the theoretical underpinnings and the practical application of RD methods can 
be found in Hahn, Todd, and Van der Klaauw (2001), Imbens and Lemieux (2008), and Lee and Lemieux 
(2010).   19 
  Panel A of Table 4 examines to what extent the reduced generosity of disability 
benefits induces individuals to shift to other forms of social assistance (including new DI 
spells).  The first row of column 1 of panel A shows that per euro reduction in disability 
benefits, individuals receive €0.31 more from other social assistance programs in 1999.  
Thus, the benefit-substitution ratio is 0.31.  A government not taking this substitution into 
account would overestimate the reduction in government expenditure from tightening the 
DI eligibility rules by 44%.  The second row shows that per €1000 per year decrease in 
DI benefits caused by the more stringent rules, the probability that an individual receives 
income from another social assistance program increases by 4.5 percentage points. An 
alternative way of scaling the degree of substitution between social assistance programs 
is provided in the second column, which shows that for a 10-percentage point reduction 
in disability replacement rates, income from other social assistance programs increases by 
€535 per year (an increase of more than 50%) and the probability of participation in other 
social assistance programs increases by 8.0 percentage points.  The estimates of panel A 
establish that benefit substitution is not only statistically significant but also important in 
economic terms. 
  Benefit  substitution  can  occur  mechanically  when  individuals  automatically 
receive more income from other social assistance programs as their DI benefits decrease.  
While this might explain some of the substitution, it cannot account for the entire reaction 
because we also observe individuals enrolling in other forms of social assistance, for 
which  enrollment  is  not  automatic.    Benefit  substitution  can  also  be  a  result  of  the 
individual actively looking for alternative sources of benefits and trying to qualify for 
them.  Finally, benefit substitution can occur when caseworkers steer individuals towards 
alternative sources of support.  We have no direct evidence on the relative importance of 
these three channels, and suspect that all three may have contributed to some degree to 
the observed amount of benefit substitution. 
  The estimate in the first row of column 1 of panel B indicates that per euro of 
benefits  decrease  caused  by  the  reform,  the  reform  induced  individuals  to  increase 
earnings by €0.62 in 1999.  In other words, we find an earnings crowd-out ratio of 0.62: a   20 
euro of DI benefits crowds out 62 cents of labor earnings.
18  Alternatively, one can scale 
the change in earnings by the change in total benefits (including the original DI benefits) 
due to the more stringent re-examination.  Given that for each euro in decreased DI 
benefits, other benefits went up by €0.31, total benefits only decreased by €0.69. Thus, 
per euro decrease in total benefits, earnings went up by €0.90 (=0.62/0.69).  The second 
row of Panel B examines the extensive margin response and shows that, per €1000 of 
disability benefits decrease caused by the reform, the probability of being employed in 
1999 increases by 2.9 percentage points.  The second column presents the analogous 
estimates,  but  now  scaled  by  the  change  in  replacement  rates  caused  by  the  more 
stringent  re-examinations.    We  find  that  for  a  10-percentage  point  decrease  in 
replacement rates, earnings increase by €1085 per year (or about 19 percent) and the 
probability of employment increases by  5.1 percentage points.  All four estimates in 
panel  B  are  highly  statistically  significant  and  establish  that  the  degree  to  which  DI 
benefits crowd out labor market earnings and participation is economically meaningful. 
  In the late 1990s, the Netherlands experienced an economic boom, which likely 
made it relatively easy for individuals to increase their labor supply and reduced the 
incentive  to  look  for  other  forms  of  social  assistance.    As  a  result,  our  estimate  for 
earnings crowd out may be higher than it would be during average economic times, and 
the  estimate  of  benefit  substitution  may  be  lower  than  it  would  be  during  average 
economic times.  During the early 2000s, the Netherlands experienced a recession, and as 
we  will  see  in  Section  4.6  below,  our  estimates  of  earnings  crowd  out  and  benefit 
substitution remained very similar during that period.  A further reason why the earnings 
crowd out estimate may be relatively high is that the Netherlands had a variety of policies 
to help individuals re-integrate into the labor market. 
DI  recipients  have  an  earnings  exemption  that  equals  their  indexed  previous 
earnings times the degree to which they deemed able to work (i.e., one minus the degree 
disabled).  Any earnings beyond the exemption are effectively taxed 100% on the margin 
through reduced DI benefits.  Thus, if the re-examination led to a reduction in the degree 
disabled, this both reduced the DI benefit (which is an income effect) and it increased the 
                                                 
18 All amounts are gross of tax and social insurance contributions.  Both benefits and earnings are subject to 
taxation and mandatory social insurance contributions, so we can directly compare changes in income to 
changes in benefits.   21 
earnings exemption (which is a substitution effect).  Therefore, like most of the previous 
literature on the labor supply response to DI, we cannot determine the extent to which the 
response is driven by the substitution effect and by the income effect. However, given the 
large magnitude of the earnings reaction (especially if compared to the change in total 
benefits), we suspect that incentive effects stemming from the change in the earnings 
exemption played a large role. 
  Panel C presents the combined effect of benefit substitution and labor crowd out.  
The estimate in the first row and column indicates that individuals increased income from 
other social assistance and work by €0.92 per euro of DI benefits lost.  In other words, on 
average individuals almost fully offset the decrease in DI benefits by increased income 
from other sources, and we cannot reject the hypothesis that the offset was complete (p-
value 0.494).  Even if the offset is complete, individuals now have to work more and will 
be worse off to the extent they receive disutility from supplying labor.
19  The second row 
shows the effect on a dummy for working or receiving income from a social assistance 
program other than the original DI spell.  We find that per €1000 decrease in DI, an 
individual is 5.7 percentage points more likely to obtain income from a new source.  The 
fact that this estimate is less than the sum of the estimates in row 2 of panels A and B 
indicates that some individuals both started working and started drawing income from 
other forms of social assistance.  In particular, per €1000 decrease in DI, individuals 
became 1.7 (=2.9+4.5-5.7) percentage points more likely to have both income from other 
social assistance programs and labor income in 1999. 
  The estimates in Table 4 are based on a bandwidth of +/- 2.5 years around the 
cutoff  age,  which  is  the  bandwidth  suggested  by  applying  the  Imbens-Kalyanaraman 
criterion (2009) to our data.  Appendix Table A4 explores the sensitivity of the benefit-
substitution ratio and the earnings crowd-out ratio to the choice of bandwidth.  For any 
bandwidth between +/- 1 year and +/- 5 years, both ratios are statistically significant at 
the 1-percent level.  The size of the benefit-substitution ratio is relatively insensitive to 
                                                 
19 Even if we cannot reject that individuals are on average able to fully offset the DI benefit cut, it is 
conceivable that certain subgroups are not able to do so.  To examine this possibility, we ran reduced-form 
quantile RD regressions on log total income (including DI income).  We find statistically significant 
declines in log total income between the 15
th and 40
th percentiles of the income distribution. See Appendix 
Figure A2 for details.   22 
the  choice  of  bandwidth  but  the  earnings  crowd-out  ratio  is  substantially  larger  for 
smaller bandwidths – it rises to 0.78 for a bandwidth of +/- 1 year.  
 
4.4 Effects by Income Source, Gender, and Degree of Disability 
  The first column of panel A of Table 5 splits out the results of the first column of 
Table 4 by source of income.  Of the increase in benefits, 67% comes from increased UI 
benefits, 10% from increased General Assistance, 3% from re-entry into DI, and 20% 
from  all  other  types  of  social  support  benefits.    We  find  that  the  increases  in  wage 
earnings account for 80% (=0.492/0.618) of the earnings response and changes in self-
employment income only for 20%.  Given that evasion of wage earnings is hard and 
limited,  this  breakdown  indicates  that  the  earnings  response  is  unlikely  to  be  largely 
driven by people not changing their actual labor supply but simply starting to report their 
earnings.  Panel B examines receipt of any amount by income sources, and its results are 
very similar to the results of panel A. 
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 5 split out the results of the first column by gender.  
These  columns  suggest  that  social  support  substitution  is  more  predominant  among 
women.  In particular, the point estimate of the benefit-substitution ratio is much larger 
for women than for men (0.48 vs. 0.26) but this difference is not statistically significant 
(p-value 0.149).  The difference is statistically significant, however, if we look at the 
participation response for other forms of social assistance.  Per €1000 decrease in DI 
benefits, women increase their participation in other social assistance programs by 7.4 
percentage points, which is nearly twice the 3.8 percentage point increase by men.  In 
response to a given DI benefit cut, women are also significantly more likely than men to 
start working whereas the point estimate of the earnings response is actually slightly 
larger for men than for women (though not significantly so).  The fact that labor force 
participation  is  only  18%  for  women  but  45%  for  men  may  explain  why  women 
experience a larger response on the extensive margin but that total earnings increase 
slightly more for men because the scope for an intensive-margin response is larger among 
men.  There is no significant difference in the degree to which men and women are able 
to offset the decrease in DI benefits by other sources of income.  As noted earlier, it is 
hard to determine what exactly drives differences in the effects of the DI reform on men   23 
and women, but we suspect differences in initial DI benefit levels, differences in types of 
disabilities,  and  differences  in  opportunities  in  market  and  household  production  are 
likely explanations.  For example, a primary diagnosis of a psychiatric condition is much 
more prevalent among women than men in our sample (39.6% vs. 28.2%) whereas a 
primary diagnosis of a musculoskeletal disorder is much more prevalent among men then 
women (39.2% vs. 28.6%). 
  Table  6  analyzes  benefit  substitution  and  earnings  crowd  out  by  the  degree 
disabled into which individuals were classified as of January 1
st 1996 (so before the re-
examinations took place).
20  Panel A shows that social support substitution is much more 
prevalent among individuals classified as fully disabled than among those classified as 
partially disabled.  This finding applies both for social assistance benefit amounts and for 
social assistance participation, and holds in the entire sample as well as the subsamples 
by  gender.    These  differences  are  not  only  statistically  significant  but  also  large  in 
magnitude.  The benefit-substitution ratio for the fully disabled is 0.50, which is four 
times as large as the ratio of 0.12 for partially disabled recipients.  About 90% of this 
difference in benefit substitution ratios is accounted for by the larger increases of UI 
benefits among the fully disabled relative to partially disabled individuals. 
  In contrast, we find high rates of labor crowd out both for those classified as 
partially disabled and for those classified as fully disabled.  Panel B shows that the point 
estimate of crowd out is somewhat higher for the partially disabled than for the fully 
disabled  (0.68  vs.  0.52),  but  this  difference  is  not  statistically  significant.    The  high 
degree to which the fully disabled are able to replace foregone disability income with 
labor  income  is  striking,  though  it  should  be  kept  in  mind  that  degree  of  disability 
depended  on  the  availability  of  suitable  jobs  in  the  applicant’s  region,  and  that  an 
applicant could also be classified as fully disabled if not enough of such jobs were found. 
  Panel C shows that both the partially and fully disabled are able to offset basically 
all of their lost DI income by other sources of income.  The point estimates indicate that 
the fully disabled actually offset somewhat more of the lost DI benefits than the partially 
disabled, but this difference is not statistically significant. 
                                                 
20 We also investigated whether the benefit-substitution ratio and the labor crowd-out ratio varied by 
marital status, previous earnings, duration of the DI spell, and national origin.  We found no significant 
differences along these dimensions.  See appendix Table A5 for details.     24 
  Our data has information on primary medical diagnoses, but much of this data 
was retrospectively added.  As a result, this data is significantly less likely to be missing 
for those who remained on DI, and there is a strong discontinuity at the age cutoff in the 
indicator for the medical diagnosis being missing.  This implies that we cannot stratify 
our estimates by medical diagnosis.  Because the medical part of the re-examination was 
the same on either side of the age cutoff, there should be no causal effect of the more 
stringent re-examination on the medical diagnosis itself.
21  Therefore any discontinuity at 
the age cutoff in the prevalence of a given medical diagnosis among those who remained 
on DI must be due to differential exit by that medical diagnosis. It turns out that we lack 
statistical precision on the inferred distribution of differential exit by medical diagnosis, 
but the point estimates indicate that the more stringent reforms led to disproportionally 
high  exit  rates  among  those  with  diagnoses  of  musculoskeletal,  psychiatric,  and 
neurological  conditions  and  disproportionally  low  exit  rates  among  those  whose 
diagnosis was labeled “general”.  Full results are in Appendix Table A6.   
 
4.5 Responses of Partners of DI recipients 
In Table 7, we provide estimates of benefit substitution and earnings crowd out at 
the household level. These estimates differ from our baseline estimates of Table 4 in that 
the current estimates account for possible responses of partners of (former) DI recipients.  
We find that our point estimates of benefit substitution in the entire sample are virtually 
identical whether or not we take the partners’ response into account.  For men the benefit 
substitution ratio becomes somewhat larger and for women it becomes smaller when we 
take the partners’ response into account, but neither difference is statistically significant. 
The increase for earnings crowd out, while at 18 percentage points not insubstantial in 
economic  terms,  is  statistically  insignificant.    Earnings  responses  of  partners  were 
previously studied by Cullen and Gruber (2000) who estimate that increased UI benefits 
paid to unemployed males are largely offset by decreased labor market earnings of their 
wives.    While  partner  responses  could  potentially  be  important,  and  therefore  are 
important to consider, we find only a limited role for them in our setting.  Including the 
                                                 
21 As explained in Section 2, the re-examination was more stringent for the younger cohort only because the 
procedure that translated medical diagnoses into replacement rates was less generous for them.   25 
partner responses, however, decreases the precision of our estimates, which is why we 
exclude them from our other analyses. 
 
4.6 Responses over time 
  Responses to reductions in DI benefits could vary over time, for example because 
it can take time to find the right match in the labor market or because certain forms of 
social assistance have time limits.  Hence, focusing only on 1999, the first year that re-
examinations are completed for individuals near each side of the age discontinuity, yields 
an incomplete picture of the consequences of the reform.  We therefore repeated our main 
analyses for all years until 2005, which is the last year in our dataset.
22  
  Panel A of Figure 5 presents estimates of the reduced-form RD regression of DI 
benefit amounts for each of the years from 1999 to 2005.  This panel shows that the effect 
of the reform on DI benefit amounts is remarkably constant over time.  Panel B shows 
estimates of the benefit-substitution ratio and the earnings crowd-out ratio over time.  In 
other words, the figure plots the coefficients from the same fuzzy RD IV regression that 
we presented in the first row of Panels A and B of Table 4, but now for all years until 
2005.  We find that both the earnings crowd-out ratio and benefit-substitution ratio are 
positive and statistically significant in each year.  The degree to which individuals replace 
lost DI benefits with other forms of social assistance decreases over time, from 31% in 
1999 to 20% in 2005.  This decrease, however, is not statistically significant.  The decline 
of the benefit-substitution ratio is driven by the decreased reliance on UI benefits over 
time. Whereas UI benefits accounted for 20 percentage points of the benefit-substitution 
ratio  in  1999,  they  only  account  for  5  percentage  points  in  2005.    This  decline  is 
consistent  with  the  fact  that  unemployment  assistance  is  only  available  for  a  limited 
duration.  This decline is partly offset by increased reliance on new DI spells.  Income 
from new DI spells account for about 1 percentage point of the 1999 benefit-substitution 
ratio but for 6 percentage points in 2005.  Reliance on General Assistance and other 
forms of social assistance remains roughly constant over time. The figure shows a slight 
                                                 
22 Additional DI reforms took place in 2002 and 2004.  The first reform only affected new entrants while 
the second reform led to a re-examination of people on DI who were younger than 50 on July 1
st, 2004.  All 
individuals in our sample were older than 50 at that time.  These reforms therefore do not affect the 
individuals in our sample.  There was a major overhaul of the DI system in 2006.  This overhaul also 
affected the individuals in our sample, which is why we end our sample period in 2005.   26 
increase over time in the earnings crowd-out ratio, which rises from 62% in 1999 to 71% 
in 2005, but this increase is not statistically significant and the fraction of earnings that 
comes  from  self-employment  remains  roughly  constant  over  time.    Finally,  Panel  C 
shows the benefit-substitution ration and the crowd-out ratio scaled by the change in DI 
benefits in 1999 in order to isolate the movements that are solely due to changes in 
earnings and social assistance receipt (other than the original DI spell).  This panel is very 
similar to the previous panel, which is not surprising given that we found before that the 
impact  of  the  more  stringent  re-examination  on  DI  benefit  amounts  was  basically 
constant over time. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
In this paper, we investigate the consequences of a reduction in the generosity of 
one  social  support  program  when  that  program  is  part  of  a  larger  system  of  social 
assistance programs.  Especially in the case of social assistance to people in their prime 
age, it was unknown to what extend reduced generosity of one program induces them to 
increase  labor  supply  and  to  what  extent  it  leads  them  to  rely  more  on  other  social 
assistance  programs  instead.    Examining  the  labor  supply  response  of  existing 
beneficiaries (as opposed to labor supply responses to qualify for a program) is important 
for policy because a response by the large stock of existing beneficiaries can quickly 
affect DI participation rates whereas a response by new enrollees will only slowly affect 
overall DI participation.  Showing a labor supply response of long-term DI beneficiaries, 
including individuals who are classified as fully disabled, also establishes that long-term 
participation  in  DI  does  not  severely  degrade  one’s  labor  market  skills.    Benefit 
substitution is of obvious policy relevance in many countries.  While existing studies 
have investigated spillover effects among programs for children or for people close to 
retirement, this paper examines benefit-substitution and earnings crowd-out effects for 
people on DI in their late 40s.  Finally, our paper recognizes that spillovers from a reform 
to one program can be partly driven by responses by the partners of people affected by 
the reform and that the spillovers may vary with the amount of time passed since the 
reform.   27 
The combination of access to extensive administrative panel data and the presence 
of a cohort discontinuity in a reform law allows us to produce causal estimates of the 
effect of the 1993 Dutch disability insurance reform on the participation in other social 
assistance  programs.    We  find  economically  meaningful  and  statistically  significant 
evidence of social support substitution.  About 2 years after the implementation of the DI 
reform for our sample members, income drawn from other social assistance programs 
increases by 31 cents for each euro of reduced DI benefits.  Thus, ignoring this benefit-
substitution effect of 31% would lead one to overestimate the cost savings of the DI 
reform  by  nearly  one  half.    At  50%,  the  benefit  substitution  effect  is  especially 
pronounced  for  the  fully  disabled  whereas  it  is  just  12%  for  partially  disabled  DI 
recipients.  While  the  benefit-substitution  ratio  decreases  over  time,  the  benefit-
substitution ratio still stands at 20% about 8 years after the implementation of the reform 
for our sample. 
We also find a remarkable earnings rebound given that all members of our sample 
were at least partially disabled and on average had been receiving DI for over a decade 
when the reform was implemented for our cohorts.  On average, individuals were able to 
make up 62% of their foregone DI benefits through increases in earnings, and this figure 
is similar for partially and fully disabled individuals.  Between increased income from 
labor and other social assistance programs, individuals almost fully offset the decrease in 
DI benefits.  Of course, these estimates are based on a relatively minor (10% on average) 
cut in DI benefits, and may not apply for larger cuts.  Also, because these estimates 
reveal average responses they can mask more severe impacts on total income for certain 
subgroups of DI recipients. 
Benefit-substitution  and  earnings  crowd-out  estimates  would  obviously  be 
different in different settings, but the direction in which the estimates would change is not 
clear.  Our benefit-substitution figure may higher than it would be in other countries 
because the Netherlands has a relatively generous system of alternative social assistance 
programs.    On  the  other  hand,  the  reform  we  analyzed  concerned  a  relatively  minor 
reduction in DI generosity.  Thus, many of those affected by the reform may not have 
qualified for means-tested alternative forms of social assistance, or alternative forms of   28 
social assistance may still have been less attractive than DI (despite the reduction in DI 
generosity).   
While  our  specific  coefficient  estimates  only  directly  apply  to  this  particular 
Dutch  DI  reform,  we  believe  our  paper  offers  three  general  lessons  that  are  widely 
applicable.  First, our paper provides strong evidence that spillover effects between social 
assistance programs can be can be substantial, also for prime-aged individuals.  Thus, any 
analysis  of  a  reform  of  a  social  assistance  program  would  be  wise  to  consider  the 
possibility of benefit substitution.  Second, we show that among long-term disability 
recipients there may still be a substantial capacity to change labor income in response to 
relatively moderate changes in DI generosity.  In other words, labor supply among DI 
recipients is not just determined by limitations from the disability, but also by economic 
incentives.  Finally, our work emphasizes that it can potentially be important to take into 
account the responses of the partners of the individuals directly affected by the reform 
and to consider the amount of benefit substitution and earnings crowd out over the longer 
term.   
  Because the discontinuity in the stringency of disability reform applies to existing 
recipients,  we  examine  social  support  substitution  and  labor  supply  responses  among 
those already receiving disability insurance at the time the reform went into effect.  Our 
setting  does  not  allow  us  to  estimate  spillover  effects  and  labor  supply  responses 
stemming from people who would have flowed into DI under the less stringent rules but 
not under the more stringent rules.  We view estimates of such spillover effects and labor 
supply responses as complementary to our estimates.   29 
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Figure 1: Magnitude of the reform 
 
Panel A: Effect on DI Benefit Amounts (1000 €/yr). Estimate of the discontinuity: -1.076 (0.096)
*** 
 
Panel B: Effect on the DI Replacement Rate. Estimate of the discontinuity: -0.059 (0.003)
*** 
 
Panel C: Effect on Participation in DI in 1999. Estimate of the discontinuity: -0.038 (0.004)
*** 
 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10 percent; ** 5 percent; *** 1 percent. Each figure 
is based on 84,185 observations. The dotted lines represent the 95% confidence intervals. Regression estimates 
come from reduced-form RD regressions without demographic control variables.  33 
Figure 2: Exit by Year 
Panel A: Exit in 1995. Estimate of the discontinuity: 0.001 (0.002) 
 
Panel B: Exit in 1996/1997. Estimate of the discontinuity: 0.051 (0.003)
*** 
 
Panel C: Exit in 1998. Estimate of the discontinuity: -0.012 (0.002)
*** 
 
Panel D: Exit in 1999. Estimate of the discontinuity: 0.001 (0.002) 
 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10 percent; ** 5 percent; *** 1 percent. The dotted 
lines represent the 95% confidence intervals. The exit rate is defined as a fraction of our sample in January 1996, 
except for panel A where it is a fraction of the sample in January 1995. Regression estimates come from reduced-
form RD regressions without demographic control variables.  34 
Figure 3: Effects of DI Reform on Social Assistance Other Than the Original DI Spell  
  








Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10 percent; ** 5 percent; *** 1 percent. Figures are 
based on 84,185 observations. The dotted lines represent the 95% confidence intervals. Benefits from the original DI 
spell are not included in social assistance income, and participation rates exclude the original DI spell. Regression 
estimates come from regressions without demographic control variables. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Figure 4: Effects of DI Reform on Labor Market Outcomes   
 
Panel A: Effect on Earnings in 1999. Estimate of the discontinuity: 624 (154)
*** 
 




Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10 percent; ** 5 percent; *** 1 percent. Figures are 
based on 84,185 observations. The dotted lines represent the 95% confidence intervals. Employment is defined as 
having positive earnings from employment or self-employment. Regression estimates come from reduced-form RD 
regressions without demographic control variables.    36 
Figure 5: Earnings Crowd Out and Benefit Shifting over Time   
 
Panel A: Effect of More Stringent Re-examination on DI Benefits in €1000/year (First Stage)  
 
 
Panel B: Earnings Crowd Out and Benefit Shifting Using Year-Specific First Stage 
 
 
Panel C: Earnings Crowd Out and Benefit Shifting Using 1999 First Stage 
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Earnings Crowd-Out Ratio   37 
Table 1: Relation between Degree of Disability and Replacement Rates 
Degree of disability:  Replacement rate (% of last earned wage): 
80 – 100 %  70 % 
65 – 80 %  50.75 % 
55 – 65 %  42 % 
45 – 55 %  35 % 
35 – 45 %  28 % 
25 – 35 %  21 % 
15 – 25 %  14 % 
Less than 15 %  0 % 
Source: UWV (2006).  UWV is the abbreviation of the agency that administers all social insurance for employees in 
the Netherlands.  See text for a description of how the degree of disability is determined. Disability insurance benefit 
levels are determined as a percentage of the last earned wage and adjusted for inflation over time. 
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Table 2:  Descriptive Statistics  
  Full sample  Males  Females 
Panel A: Sample characteristics, measured prior to re-examination 
Female (0=no; 1=yes)  0.34  0.00  1.00 
Married (0=no; 1=yes)  0.66  0.69  0.61 
Age on August 1
st, 1993  45.18  45.19  45.18 
Start date of DI spell (year)  1985.1  1984.8  1985.7 
Degree of disability (% of earnings capacity lost): 
  15-25  7.67  8.85  5.36 
  25-35  9.53  11.96  4.74 
  35-45  6.91  8.75  3.28 
  45-55  5.78  6.32  4.74 
  55-65  2.01  2.22  1.60 
  65-80  1.97  2.41  1.11 
  80-100  66.1  59.50  79.17 
       
Panel B: Outcomes after re-examination       
Labor market status in 1999 (%):       
  Still on DI (on the original spell)  91.75  91.68  91.89 
  Employed  35.75  44.78  18.03 
  Social assistance (other than original DI spell)  15.50  14.78  16.92 
  Zero income (dummy for no formal income)  3.91  3.66  4.39 
       
Labor market status in 2005 (%):       
  Still on DI (on the original spell)  81.01  80.04  82.91 
  Employed  28.84  36.36  14.09 
  Social assistance (other than original DI spell)  24.94  26.41  22.06 
  Zero income (dummy for no formal income)  8.46  8.97  7.46 
       
Income by source in 1999, €/year (including zeros):       
  DI from original DI spell  10,296  11,135  8,649 
  Earnings  5,916  7,753  2,309 
  Social assistance (other than original DI spell)     949     862  1,120 
Income by source in 1999, €/year (if non-zero):       
  DI from original DI spell  11,731  12,732    9,785 
  Earnings  17,045  17,814  13,282 
  Social assistance (other than original DI spell)  6,169  5,900    6,631 
       
Income by source in 2005, €/year (including zeros):       
  DI from original DI spell  11,421  12,343  9,611 
  Earnings  5,452  7,136  2,145 
  Social assistance (other than original DI spell)  1,940  1,854  2,107 
Income by source in 2005, €/year (if non-zero):       
  DI from original DI spell  14,491  15,887  11,862 
  Earnings  20,136  20,889  16,308 
  Social assistance (other than original DI spell)  7,793  7,038  9,569 
       
N  84,185  55,772  28,413 
Note: Since we have information available from 1996 onwards, both marital status and degree of disability are 
recorded in January 1996 (before the re-examinations). 
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Table 3: Re-examinations and the Change in the Replacement Rate between 1996 and 1999 
  (1)  (2)    (3) 
Change in the  
replacement rate 
Predicted probability 
 at age 45.0 for the  
less stringent  
re-examination 
Predicted probability 
 at age 45.0 for the 
more stringent  
re-examination 
  Treatment effect of the more 
stringent examination on the 
probability of the specified 
change in replacement rate 
7 "steps" less generous  6.10  7.81    1.70  (0.35) 
6 "steps" less generous  0.47  1.52    1.05  (0.11) 
5 "steps" less generous  0.84  2.43    1.59  (0.13) 
4 "steps" less generous  1.08  2.26    1.18  (0.15) 
3 "steps" less generous  1.12  2.31    1.19  (0.16) 
2 "steps" less generous  2.23  3.76    1.52  (0.21) 
1 "step" less generous  3.90  9.01    5.11  (0.28) 
Same generosity  72.17  65.52    -6.65  (0.59) 
1 "step" more generous  3.52  1.40    -2.12  (0.18) 
2 "steps" more generous  1.46  0.67    -0.79  (0.12) 
3 "steps" more generous  1.57  0.90    -0.66  (0.14) 
4 "steps" more generous  1.87  0.91    -0.96  (0.14) 
5 "steps" more generous  2.13  0.85    -1.28  (0.15) 
6 "steps" more generous  1.54  0.66    -0.89  (0.12) 
           
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.  Each row is estimated using our standard reduced-form RD regression 
without demographic controls, where the outcome variable is a dummy for the change in the replacement rate 
between 1996 and 1999 that corresponds to row header.  There are eight possible replacement rates: 0%, 14%, 21%, 
28%, 35%, 42%, 50.75%, 70%, where we assign 0% to those who exit from DI before the post-examination 
replacement rate is recorded. Column 1 shows the intercept at age 45.0 from the regression line to the right of the 
discontinuity (i.e., for those who underwent the less stringent re-examination), column 2 shows the intercept at age 
45.0 from the regression line to the left of the discontinuity (i.e., for those who underwent the more stringent re-
examination), and column 3 shows the treatment effect (i.e., the difference between columns 1 and 2). N=84,185. 
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Table 4: Earnings Crowd Out and Benefit Shifting  
  Effect scaled by decrease in 
amount of original DI 
(in 1000 €/year) 
Effect scaled by decrease in 
the replacement rate 
(fraction) 
         
Panel A: Other social assistance in 1999 
   Income from other social assistance  0.305    (0.047)
***  5.353    (0.801)
*** 
   Participation dummy  0.045    (0.005)
***  0.797    (0.082)
*** 
 
Panel B: Labor market outcomes in 1999 
   Earnings  0.618    (0.108)
***  10.848    (1.924)
*** 
   Employment dummy  0.029    (0.005)
***  0.511    (0.084)
*** 
 
Panel C: Total 
   Income except from original DI spell  0.923    (0.113)
***  16.201    (1.983)
*** 
   Dummy for work or other social assistance  0.057    (0.006)
***  0.992    (0.092)
*** 
         
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10 percent; ** 5 percent; *** 1 percent. Each entry 
in the table comes from a separate IV regression based on the fuzzy RD design.  The dependent variable is listed in 
the rows.  Other social assistance only includes disability income from re-entry in to disability (so it excludes 
disability income from the original spell).  The variable that is instrumented (endogenous explanatory variable) is 
listed in the columns.  The instrument itself is the treatment dummy (age as of 8/1/93 less than 45). Earnings and 
income  are  measured  in  thousands  of  euros  per  year.  The  replacement  rate  is  expressed  as  a  fraction.  Each 
regression is based on 84,185 observations. The following controls are used in the regressions: age in months as of 
8/1/93,  (age-45)  interacted  with  the  treatment  dummy,  6  dummies  for  degree  of  disability  in  1996,  a  cubic 
polynomial  in  pre-DI  earnings,  9  national  origin  dummies,  a  dummy  for  being  married  in  1996,  39  regional 
dummies, a cubic polynomial in duration in DI at the start of the reform, a full set of interactions between the 
dummies for the degree of disability and the cubic polynomial in pre-DI earnings, a gender dummy, and a full set of 
interactions between all previously listed controls and gender.  In total, each regression has 163 control variables. 
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Table 5: Earnings Crowd Out and Benefit Shifting by Source and by Gender  
   
Effect of reform per 1000 €/year  
decrease in amount of original DI  P-value 
gender dif.    Full sample  Males  Females 
               
Panel A: Amounts in 1999               
Total other social assistance, of which:  0.305   (0.047)
***  0.261   (0.047)
***  0.482   (0.146)
***  0.149 
    Unemployment insurance  0.203   (0.020)
***  0.187   (0.021)
***  0.266   (0.051)
***   
    General assistance  0.030   (0.007)
***  0.032   (0.007)
***  0.024   (0.024)   
    Re-entry into DI  0.008   (0.008)  -0.001   (0.009)  0.046   (0.025)
*   
    All other benefits  0.063   (0.041)  0.043   (0.040)  0.146   (0.129)   
               
Total earnings, of which:  0.618     (0.108)
***  0.632   (0.124)
***  0.564   (0.208)
***  0.781 
    Wage earnings  0.492   (0.098)
***  0.497   (0.114)
***  0.471   (0.181)
***   
    Self-employment earnings  0.126     (0.061)
**  0.135   (0.070)
*  0.093   (0.113)   
               
Total income from other income sources  0.923   (0.113)
***  0.892   (0.127)
***  1.046   (0.250)
***  0.582 
               
Panel B: Participation in1999               
Any income from other social assistance  0.045   (0.005)
***  0.038   (0.005)
***  0.074   (0.016)
***  0.037 
    Any Unemployment insurance  0.034   (0.003)
***  0.030   (0.003)
***  0.050   (0.009)
***   
    Any general assistance  0.009   (0.002)
***  0.010   (0.002)
***  0.007   (0.006)   
    Re-entry into DI  0.001   (0.001)
 **  0.001   (0.001)
 *  0.003   (0.002)   
    Any other benefits  0.015   (0.004)
***  0.010   (0.004)
**  0.035   (0.013)
***   
               
Any work  0.029   (0.005)
***  0.023   (0.005)
***  0.053   (0.013)
***  0.026 
    Any wage income  0.024   (0.005)
***  0.018   (0.005)
***  0.050   (0.012)
***   
    Any self-employment income  0.006   (0.003)
**  0.007   (0.003)
**  -0.001   (0.005)   
               
Any other income source  0.057   (0.006)
***  0.044   (0.006)
***  0.105   (0.019)
***  0.002 
               
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10 percent; ** 5 percent; *** 1 percent. Each entry 
in the table comes from a separate IV regression based on the fuzzy RD design.  The dependent variable is listed in 
the rows.  Income and earnings are measured in thousands of euros per year.  “Other income sources” excludes DI 
income from the original spell.  General assistance provides an income floor for everyone and does not require 
having dependents. Any other benefits are benefits from a large number of smaller (about 30) benefit programs. The 
variable that is instrumented (endogenous explanatory variable) is the amount of DI, so all coefficients can be 
interpreted as effect size per €1000/year decrease in DI.  The instrument itself is the treatment dummy (age less than 
45 as of 8/1/93). The regressions are based on 84,185, 55,772, and 28,413 observations for the full sample, males, 
and females, respectively. See the note to Table 4 for the demographic controls included in the regression.   42 
Table 6: Earnings Crowd Out and Benefit Shifting by Degree of Disability and Gender 
   
Effect of reform per 1000 €/yr  
decrease in amount of original DI  P-value 
gender dif.    Full sample  Males  Females 
               
Panel A: Other social assistance in 1999 
   Income from other social assistance               
      Partially disabled in 1996  0.122   (0.048)
**  0.124   (0.049)
**  0.112   (0.143)  0.939 
      Fully disabled in 1996  0.501   (0.087)
***  0.415   (0.084)
***  0.803   (0.271)
***  0.171 
      p-value on difference by disability  <0.001  0.003  0.024   
   Participation dummy               
      Partially disabled in 1996  0.015   (0.006)
***  0.016   (0.006)
***  0.012   (0.015)  0.840 
      Fully disabled in 1996  0.078   (0.010)
***  0.063   (0.010)
***  0.131   (0.035)
***  0.062 
      p-value on difference by disability  <0.001  <0.001  0.002   
 
Panel B: Labor market outcomes in 1999 
   Earnings               
      Partially disabled in 1996  0.682   (0.166)
***  0.732   (0.186)
***  0.435   (0.357)  0.460 
      Fully disabled in 1996  0.520   (0.128)
***  0.506   (0.148)
***  0.572   (0.250)
**  0.819 
      p-value on difference by disability  0.441  0.341  0.753   
   Employment dummy               
      Partially disabled in 1996  0.023   (0.006)
***  0.020   (0.006)
***  0.037   (0.017)
**  0.357 
      Fully disabled in 1996  0.034   (0.008)
***  0.026   (0.009)
***  0.062   (0.019)
***  0.087 
      p-value on difference by disability  0.246  0.555  0.333   
               
Panel C: Total 
   Income except from original DI spell               
      Partially disabled in 1996  0.804   (0.163)
***  0.856   (0.182)
***  0.547   (0.360)  0.444 
      Fully disabled in 1996  1.021   (0.153)
***  0.921   (0.166)
***  1.376   (0.392)
***  0.285 
      p-value on difference by disability  0.332  0.793  0.119   
   Dummy for work or other soc. asst.               
      Partially disabled in 1996  0.030   (0.005)
***  0.028   (0.005)
***  0.036   (0.017)
**  0.656 
      Fully disabled in 1996  0.084   (0.011)
***  0.062   (0.011)
***  0.163   (0.041)
***  0.017 
      p-value on difference by disability  <0.001  0.005  0.004   
         
N         
      Partially disabled in 1996  28,509  22,590  5,919   
      Fully disabled in 1996  55,676  33,182  22,494   
               
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10 percent; ** 5 percent; *** 1 percent. Each entry 
in the table comes from a separate IV regression based on the fuzzy RD design.  The dependent variable is listed in 
the rows.  Income and earnings are measured in thousands of euros per year.  The variable that is instrumented 
(endogenous explanatory variable) is the amount of DI, so all coefficients can be interpreted as effect size per 
€1000/year decrease in DI.  The instrument itself is the treatment dummy (age less than 45 as of 8/1/93).  Degree of 
disability is as determined by the disability administration (see text for the description of the procedure for the 
determination  of  degree  of  disability).  See  the  note  to  Table  4  for  the  demographic  controls  included  in  the 
regression.   43 
Table 7: Earnings Crowd Out and Benefit Shifting Including Partner Responses  
   
Effect of reform per 1000 €/yr  
decrease in amount of original DI 
P-value 
gender dif. 
  Full sample  Males  Females 
               
Panel A: Labor market outcomes in 1999 
   Earnings  0.795   (0.209)
***  0.718   (0.182)
***  1.102   (0.749)  0.619 
 
Panel B: Other social assistance in 1999 
   Income from other social assistance  0.302   (0.083)
***  0.307   (0.065)
***  0.284   (0.318)  0.945 
 
Panel C: Total 
   Income except from original DI spell  1.097   (0.204)
***  1.025   (0.185)
***  1.386   (0.705)
**  0.620 
               
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10 percent; ** 5 percent; *** 1 percent. Each entry 
in the table comes from a separate IV regression based on the fuzzy RD design.  The dependent variable is listed in 
the rows.  Income and earnings are measured in thousands of euros per year.  The variable that is instrumented 
(endogenous explanatory variable) is the amount of DI, so all coefficients can be interpreted as effect size per 
€1000/year decrease in DI.  The instrument itself is the treatment dummy (age less than 45 as of 8/1/93). The 
regressions are based on 84,185 observations for the full sample, and on 55,772 and 28,413 observations for males 
and females, respectively. See the note to Table 4 for the demographic controls included in the regression. 
 
   44 
Figure A1: Number of Observations by Cohort 
 
Note: The McCrary density test is insignificant (p-value 0.126).  The large trough and spike around ages 47 and 48 
are the effect of WWII (the “hunger winter of 1944”) and the subsequent baby boom. 
 
Figure A2: Quantile Regressions of Effect of More Stringent Re-examination on Log Total Income  
 
Note: Each dot corresponds the estimated effect from an RD quantile regression with log total income as the 
outcome variable.  Lines correspond to 95-percent confidence intervals.    Log  total  income  is  bottom  coded  at 
€1000/year to avoid very large percentage swings at very low incomes. Weighted by income (not logged), the 
average estimated effect of the more stringent re-examination is a 0.9% decline in total income. 
Appendix A: Additional Results (not for publication)   45 
Appendix Table A1: Placebo Regressions 
           
  N  Treatment dummy: age<45  P-value  Sample mean 
Panel A: Gender           
Female  84185  0.000  (0.007)  0.958  0.338 
           
Panel B: Degree DI in 1996           
Degree DI in 1996 (scale of 1-8)  84185  0.037  (0.031)  0.231  6.554 
Degree DI is 15-25% in 1996  84185  -0.001  (0.004)  0.797  0.077 
Degree DI is 25-35% in 1996  84185  -0.009  (0.004)
**  0.039  0.095 
Degree DI is 35-45% in 1996  84185  0.003  (0.004)  0.327  0.069 
Degree DI is 45-55% in 1996  84185  -0.001  (0.003)  0.666  0.058 
Degree DI is 55-65% in 1996  84185  -0.000  (0.002)  0.827  0.020 
Degree DI is 65-80% in 1996  84185  0.003  (0.002)  0.160  0.020 
Degree DI is 80-100% in 1996  84185  0.005  (0.007)  0.444  0.661 
           
Panel C: Province           
Province: Friesland  84185  -0.002  (0.003)  0.523  0.040 
Province: Drenthe  84185  0.001  (0.003)  0.774  0.034 
Province: Overijssel  84185  0.001  (0.004)  0.704  0.073 
Province: Flevoland  84185  0.000  (0.002)  0.826  0.018 
Province: Gelderland  84185  0.002  (0.004)  0.633  0.111 
Province: Utrecht  84185  0.003  (0.003)  0.322  0.066 
Province: Noord-Holland  84185  -0.008  (0.006)  0.164  0.192 
Province: Zuid-Holland  84185  -0.006  (0.005)  0.258  0.168 
Province: Zeeland  84185  -0.000  (0.002)  0.838  0.016 
Province: Noord-Brabant  84185  0.002  (0.005)  0.731  0.151 
Province: Limburg  84185  0.007  (0.004)
*  0.074  0.090 
           
Panel D: Duration in DI in 1993           
Duration on DI (months; as of 8/1993)  84185  -0.601  (1.037)  0.562  96.72 
Duration: 5 years or more  84185  -0.007  (0.007)  0.284  0.592 
           
Panel E: Marital status in 1996           
Married   84185  0.007  (0.007)  0.260  0.664 
           
Panel F: Earnings before DI           
Previous earnings (euro/yr)  84185  13.0  (123.8)  0.916  16928 
Quintile 1   84185  -0.003  (0.006)  0.601  0.200 
Quintile 2  84185  0.005  (0.006)  0.413  0.200 
Quintile 3  84185  -0.004  (0.006)  0.528  0.200 
Quintile 4  84185  0.005  (0.006)  0.351  0.200 
Quintile 5  84185  -0.003  (0.006)  0.550  0.200 
           
Panel G: Origin           
Native Dutch  84185  0.003  (0.005)  0.608  0.834 
Morocco  84185  -0.001  (0.001)  0.246  0.005 
Turkey  84185  0.003  (0.002)  0.143  0.028 
Surinam  84185  -0.005  (0.002)
***  0.007  0.018 
Antilles and Aruba  84185  -0.000  (0.001)  0.654  0.003 
Other Non-Western Country  84185  -0.000  (0.001)  0.917  0.008 
Netherlands, but born elsewhere  84185  -0.000  (0.003)  0.919  0.059 
Other Western Country  84185  0.002  (0.002)  0.298  0.019 
East-Europe  84185  0.001  (0.001)  0.330  0.009 
Dutch East Indies  84185  -0.002  (0.002)  0.189  0.017 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10 percent; ** 5 percent; *** 1 percent. Each 
coefficient is estimated using our standard reduced-form RD regression without demographic controls. Previous 
earnings are capped at the maximum amount covered by DI (about €36,000/year in 1999).   46 
Table A2: Replacement Rates and Re-examinations  
                     
Panel A: Joint distribution of the 1996 and 1999 replacement rates at age 45.0 under the less stringent re-examination  
  Replacement rate in 1999     
Replacement rate in 1996  0%  14%  21%  28%  35%  42%  50.75%  70%    Total 
14%  1.65  2.43  0.74  0.23  0.13  0.04  0.02  1.54    6.79 
21%  1.43  0.72  3.64  1.07  0.33  0.10  0.11  2.11    9.49 
28%  0.59  0.15  0.60  3.10  0.65  0.18  0.08  1.72    7.06 
35%  0.55  0.05  0.18  0.40  2.93  0.36  0.21  1.26    5.94 
42%  0.22  0.00  0.04  0.07  0.15  0.92  0.14  0.51    2.07 
50.75%  0.11  0.00  0.02  0.03  0.07  0.10  0.83  0.55    1.71 
70%  6.14  0.35  0.62  0.52  0.38  0.28  0.32  58.33    66.93 
                     
Total  10.68  3.70  5.85  5.42  4.64  1.98  1.70  66.02    100.00 
                     
Panel B: Treatment effect of the more stringent re-examination on the joint distribution of 1996 and 1999 replacement rates 
  Replacement rate in 1999     
Replacement rate in 1996  0%  14%  21%  28%  35%  42%  50.75%  70%    Total 
14%  1.36  0.21  -0.52  -0.12  -0.11  -0.02  -0.01  -0.89    -0.10 
  (0.21)  (0.28)  (0.08)  (0.05)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.12)    (0.37) 
21%  0.33  1.07  -0.11  -0.59  -0.25  0.01  -0.04  -1.27    -0.85 
  (0.18)  (0.11)  (0.32)  (0.10)  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.15)    (0.41) 
28%  0.31  0.42  1.38  -0.37  -0.44  -0.10  0.04  -0.89    0.35 
  (0.12)  (0.06)  (0.11)  (0.28)  (0.07)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.13)    (0.36) 
35%  0.14  0.16  0.36  0.53  -0.47  -0.19  -0.06  -0.61    -0.14 
  (0.10)  (0.04)  (0.06)  (0.08)  (0.26)  (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.13)    (0.33) 
42%  0.02  0.09  0.10  0.08  0.13  -0.16  -0.05  -0.25    -0.04 
  (0.06)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.15)  (0.04)  (0.08)    (0.20) 
50.75%  0.11  0.08  0.10  0.14  0.03  0.08  0.07  -0.33    0.27 
  (0.05)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.16)  (0.09)    (0.20) 
70%  1.75  0.98  1.46  0.83  0.49  0.30  0.51  -5.82    0.51 
  (0.35)  (0.09)  (0.11)  (0.10)  (0.09)  (0.07)  (0.08)  (0.69)    (0.66) 
                     
Total  4.01  3.01  2.78  0.50  -0.61  -0.09  0.46  -10.06    0.00 
  (0.45)  (0.32)  (0.36)  (0.32)  (0.29)  (0.19)  (0.19)  (0.68)    (0.00) 
                     
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Panel A shows the predicted joint probability of replacement rates in 1996 and 1999 at exactly age 45. Each entry is 
estimated as the intercept at age 45.0 of the regression line to the right of the discontinuity (i.e., for those who underwent the less stringent re-examination). Panel 
B shows the treatment effect of the more stringent re-examination on each joint probability of replacement rates.  Each entry is estimated using our standard 
reduced-form RD regression without demographic controls, where outcome variable is a dummy for combination of replacement rates in 1996 and 1999 that 
corresponds to that cell. Those who exit DI before the post-examination replacement rate is recorded are assigned a replacement rate of 0. N=84,185.   47 
Appendix Table A3: Baseline Estimates Without Controls Variables 
   
Effect of reform per 1000 €/year  
decrease in amount of original DI 
 
  Full Sample  Males  Females 
   
Panel A: Other social assistance in 1999   
   Income from other social assistance  0.292  (0.053)
***  0.246  (0.051)
***  0.511     (0.194)
*** 
   Participation dummy  0.044  (0.006)
***  0.037  (0.006)
***  0.080     (0.024)
*** 
Panel B: Labor market outcomes in 1999   
   Earnings  0.580  (0.135)
***  0.659  (0.144)
***  0.254        (0.285)
*** 
   Employment dummy  0.027  (0.006)
***  0.026  (0.006)
***  0.036     (0.017)
** 
Panel C: Total   
   Income except from original DI spell  0.872  (0.142)
***  0.906  (0.147)
***  0.765     (0.343)
** 
   Dummy for work or other soc. asst.  0.054  (0.007)
***  0.045  (0.006)
***  0.094     (0.027)
*** 
             
Note:  Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10 percent; ** 5 percent; *** 1 percent. The 
estimates in this table come from regressions that are identical to those used in Tables 4 and 5 except that the 
regressions for this table do not include demographic controls (except, of course, age as of 8/1/93 and the interaction 
of (age-45) with the treatment dummy). 
 
 
Appendix Table A4: Sensitivity of Baseline Estimates to Bandwidth 
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Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10 percent; ** 5 percent; *** 1 percent.   The table 
shows our key estimates of the effect of the more stringent re-examination on the DI amount, the benefit-substitution 
ratio, and the earnings crowd-out ratio for different choices of bandwidth.  Our baseline choice of bandwidth (+/- 2.5 
years) was guided by the Imbens-Kalyanaraman (2009) criterion.   48 
Appendix Table A5: Heterogeneity of Effect 
 
 
Effect scaled by decrease in amount of original DI 
(in 1000 €/year) 




   Income from other social 
assistance 
Panel A: By marital status 
  Married  55913  0.551  (0.110)
***  0.253  (0.042)
*** 
  Single  28272  0.879  (0.326)
***  0.496  (0.183)
*** 
     p-value  on 
difference    0.341 
0.196 
           
Panel B: By previous earnings 
  Below median  42095  0.563  (0.156)
***  0.369  (0.070)
*** 
  Above median  42090  0.676  (0.144)
***  0.255  (0.063)
*** 
     p-value  on 
difference    0.597 
0.223 
           
Panel C: By origin 
  Native Dutch  70205  0.658  (0.128)
***  0.286  (0.055)
*** 
  Other origin  13980  0.495  (0.186)
***  0.360  (0.092)
*** 
     p-value  on 
difference    0.470 
0.489 
           
Panel D: By duration on DI as of 8/1/1993 
  Less than 5 years  34378  0.897  (0.272)
***  0.236  (0.126)
* 
  More than 5 years  49807  0.512  (0.109)
***  0.326  (0.044)
*** 
     p-value  on 
difference    0.189 
0.477 
           
Panel E: By degree of disability in 1996 
  Partially disabled  28509  0.682  (0.166)
***  0.122   (0.048)
** 
  Fully disabled  55676  0.520  (0.128)
***  0.501   (0.087)
*** 
     p-value  on 
difference   
0.441  <0.001 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10 percent; ** 5 percent; *** 1 percent.   Each entry 
comes from our standard fuzzy RD regression with the outcome variable indicated in the column header and the 
sample indicated in the row header.  Previous earnings are the earnings to which the DI replacement rate is applied.   
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Appendix Table A6: Inferred Distribution of Medical Conditions Among Those Induced to Exit DI 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10 percent; ** 5 percent; *** 1 percent. We run a reduced-form RD regression with our standard 
controls (see note to Table 4) on the sample of those who remain on DI, where outcome variable is a dummy for the individual having as main diagnosis the 
condition indicated in the row header. Column 1 shows the intercept at the cutoff age (exactly 45 on 8/1/93) from the regression line to the left of the 
discontinuity (i.e., for those who underwent the more stringent re-examination), column 2 shows the intercept at the cutoff age from the regression line to the 
right of the discontinuity (i.e., for those who underwent the less stringent re-examination), and column 3 shows the “treatment effect” (i.e., the difference 
between columns 1 and 2) among the selected sample of those who remain on DI.  Under the (reasonable) assumption that there is no difference between the 
more stringent and less stringent re-examination on the main diagnosis for a given individual, the “treatment effect” is due to differential exit by medical 
condition. The composition of medical conditions of those induced to exit by the more stringent re-examination is listed in columns (6) and (7). N=74,028 for the 
regressions that generate the estimates in columns (1) through (3). 
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(7)/(2): 
Medical condition  (1)  (2)  (3)    (4)  (5)    (6)    (7)    (8) 
                           
Musculoskeletal  37.4  38.0  -0.62  (0.69) 
 
33.4  35.4 
 
2.0    52.5 
 
1.38 
Psychiatric  31.8  32.8  -0.98  (0.67) 
 
28.4  30.5 
 
2.1    55.7 
 
1.70 
General  12.6  10.6  1.96  (0.46)
*** 
 
11.3  9.9 
 
-1.3    -35.5 
 
-3.33 
Neurological  4.1  4.7  -0.60  (0.32)
* 
 
3.6  4.3 
 
0.7    18.7 
 
4.00 
Cardiovascular  4.3  4.4  -0.07  (0.32) 
 
3.9  4.1 
 
0.2    6.0 
 
1.36 
Digestive system  2.1  2.3  -0.13  (0.22) 
 
1.9  2.1 
 
0.2    5.2 
 
2.31 
Respiratory system   2.2  2.1  0.09  (0.22) 
 
2.0  2.0 
 
0.0    0.0 
 
-0.02 
Urological  1.5  1.3  0.14  (0.18) 
 
1.3  1.2 
 
-0.1    -1.9 
 
-1.43 
Visual impairment  1.0  0.9  0.04  (0.14) 
 
0.9  0.9 
 
0.0    0.1 
 
0.10 
Endocrinology  0.9  0.9  0.01  (0.15) 
 
0.8  0.8 
 
0.0    0.6 
 
0.65 
Hearing impairment  0.8  0.8  0.01  (0.14) 
 
0.7  0.8 
 
0.0    0.6 
 
0.67 
Dermatological  0.9  0.7  0.15  (0.14) 
 
0.8  0.7 
 
-0.1    -2.8 
 
-3.80 
Hematological  0.4  0.3  0.02  (0.09) 
 
0.3  0.3 
 
0.0    -0.2 
 
-0.49 
Pregnancy related  0.0  0.1  -0.04  (0.04) 
 
0.0  0.1 
 
0.0    0.9 
 
11.64 
                   
 
      Total  100.0  100.0  0.00 
   
89.4  93.2 
 
3.8    100.0 
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Appendix B: Variable Definitions (not for publication) 
 
Variables  come  from  the  datasets  described  below.    The  data  sets  are  merged  based  on  an 
individual identifier that is a scrambled version of the Dutch equivalent of a Social Security 
Number (“burgerservicenummer”). 
 
Earnings and other sources of income 
Information  on  income  by  source  comes  from  various  administrative  datasets.  Employment 
earnings (from the jobs database, “SSB-Banen”) and self-employment earnings (from the self-
employed database, “SSB-Zelfst”) are obtained from yearly tax files, and hence comprise annual 
gross  earnings  measured  in  euros.  Gross  benefit  payments  are  registered  monthly  by  the 
respective benefit administration offices. From these monthly payments we construct the income 
flow for each source of benefits in euros per year.  Benefits are gross; they are subject to income 
taxation and social insurance contributions.  All amounts are nominal but inflation was low 
(around 3%/yr) in the time period of our data. 
 
 
Variable  Dataset  Definition  Timing & Units 
 
I. Labor market earnings  
Employment  SSB-
Banen 
Employment  participation:  having  positive 
annual  income  from  paid  employment  in  a 
given year 
 
Employment earnings: gross annual earnings 
from paid employment (0 if not employed) 
 
Measured by year; 
0/1 dummy  
 
 






Self-employment  participation:  having 
positive  annual  income  (profits)  from  self-
employment in a given year 
 
Self-employment  earnings:  gross  annual 
earnings (profits) from self-employment (0 if 
not self-employed) 
Measured by year; 
0/1 dummy  
 
 
Measured by year; 
euros/year 
 
II. Social support benefits 
Unemployment 
insurance  
WW  Unemployment  insurance  participation: 
having positive annual income from UI in a 
given year 
 
Unemployment income: gross annual income 
from UI (0 if not unemployed) 
 
Measured by year; 
0/1 dummy  
 
 






General  assistance  participation:  having 
positive annual income from GA in a given 
year 
Measured by year; 
0/1 dummy  
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General  assistance  income:  gross  annual 
income from GA (0 if not enrolled in GA) 
 
 
Measured by year; 
euros/year 
Re-entry  into 
disability 
insurance 
AO  Re-entry  in  DI:  having  positive  annual 
income from DI in a given year coming from 
a new DI-spell 
 
New DI income: gross annual income from 
DI (0 if not enrolled in DI) coming from a 
new DI-spell 
 
Measured by year; 
0/1 dummy  
 
 
Measured by year; 
euros/year 
Other  sources 
of benefits 
OUITK  Participation  in  other  benefit  programs: 
having  positive  annual  income  from  other 
programs in a given year 
 
Income  from  other  benefit  programs:  gross 
annual income from other programs (0 if not 
enrolled in scheme) 
Measured by year; 
0/1 dummy  
 
 




DI administrative data 
The disability offices in The Netherlands register many details for each DI claimant. From 1996 
onwards, there is monthly information about all DI claimants in the Netherlands. Information 
includes start and end dates of DI-spells, degree of disability, amount benefit paid, and previous 
earnings, which is used as a reference to calculate the benefit level. 
 
Variable  Dataset  Definition  Timing & Units 
Disability  AO  Participation in DI: The original DI spell (i.e. 
the one that the individual was on when the 
reform was enacted on 8/1/93) continues into 
at least part of the current year 
 
Income from DI: gross annual income from 
disability insurance benefits stemming from 
the original DI spell (0 if not enrolled in DI) 
 
Measured by year; 








AO  The  degree  of  disability  before  the  re-
examination  started.  Categorical  variable, 
based on percentage income loss due to DI 
(0-15%, 15-25%, 25-35%, 35-45%, 45-55%, 
55-65%, 65-80%, 80-100%). 
 
Measured as of 
January 1996; 1-8 
scale, increasing in 




AO  Gross  annual  earnings  (including  vacation 
allowance, yearly bonus, extra pay for shift 
work,  etc.)  in  the  year  before  entry  in  DI. 
Taken from the 
1996 database, but 
refers to whichever   52 
This  amount  was  capped  at  a  certain 
maximum  level  of  earnings  (€35,754  per 
year in 1999). 
 
was the last year of 
work prior to DI; 
euros/year. 










Each city (or aggregation of small villages) in The Netherlands keeps a registry (“GBA”) of all 
its native and foreign inhabitants. When an individual moves within the Netherlands, the person 
has to register in the new city (and unregister in the old city). Whenever there is a demographic 
change (e.g., child born, marriage), this is registered by the city administration. In this paper, we 
use the following demographics from the municipal registries: date of birth, gender, place of 
residence, origin, and marital status. 
 
Variable  Dataset  Definition  Timing & Units 
Age  GBA  Age  in  months  at  the  time  of  the  reform, 








GBA  Dummy  calculated  from  marital  status 
information.  
 
Measured as of 
January 1996; 
Dummy equals 1 if 
married 
Gender  GBA  Dummy if person is female 
 
Measured as of 
January 1996; 
Dummy equals 1 if 
female 
Origin  GBA  Origin based on someone’s country of birth 
and that of his/her parents. Native Dutch are 
those (i) born in The Netherlands just as their 
parents, and those (ii) born in another country 
whose  parents  were  both  born  in  The 
Netherlands. Non-native Dutch are all others 
for whom at least one parent was not born in 
The  Netherlands.  Within  the  group  of  non-
native  Dutch  we  distinguish  between 
countries of origin. For those born abroad, the 
country  of  birth  is  taken  as  the  country  of 
origin.  When  born  in  the  Netherlands,  the 
country of birth of the mother is taken as the 
country of origin. When both the individual 
and the mother are born in the Netherlands, 
the country of origin is based on the country 
Measured as of 
January 1996; 10 
dummy (0/1) 
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of birth of the father. We create 10 original 
dummies for the following categories: 
Native  Dutch,  Morocco,  Turkey,  Surinam, 
Dutch  Antilles  and  Aruba,  Other  Non-
Western Country, Dutch but born elsewhere, 
Other  Western  Country,  East-European 
Country, and Dutch East Indies. 
Region  GBA  Based on the place of residence (i.e., the city 
where  someone  is  registered),  we  create  40 
regional  dummies  that  correspond  to  the 
COROP  regions  as  defined  by  the 
Coordination Commission Regional Research 
Programme (see 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/COROP for more 
information). 
Measured as of 
January 1996; 40 
dummy (0/1)  
variables 
 